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The impact of the 1999 CAP reforms on the efficiency of the 
COP sector in Spain 
 
 
Abstract 
The cereal, oilseeds, and protein crop sector (COP) occupies a prominent position 
within the European Union’s agricultural sector. Within Spain, the COP sector accounts 
for almost a third of total Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund expenses, and a 
half of the utilized agricultural area. The COP sector is not only relevant because of its 
physical and economic magnitude, but also because of the political attention it receives. 
The Common Agricultural Policy reforms that occurred during the 1990s paid special 
attention to this sector.  
This paper aims to determine the impacts of Agenda 2000 on a sample of 
Spanish COP farmers’ production decisions by using an output-oriented stochastic 
distance function. The distance function allows for an assessment of the reform-
motivated changes on total output, input used, input composition and crop mix. It also 
permits an assessment of the impacts of the reform on farms’ technical efficiency.  
Results show that the reform has shifted the production frontier inward and 
changed output composition in favor of voluntary set aside land. With respect to input 
composition, Agenda 2000 induced a decrease in land, fertilizers, pesticides and other 
inputs in favor of labor. In addition, Agenda 2000 has had a negative impact on 
technical efficiency. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The cereal, oilseeds and protein crop (COP) sector occupies a prominent 
position within the European Union’s (EU) agricultural sector. This sector represented 
11% of the EU’s final agricultural output and 21% of the aggregate farm income in 
2003. Moreover, the total COP area amounts to 40% of the total Utilized Agricultural 
Area (UAA) in the EU, and 43.3% of the European Agricultural Guidance and 
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Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) expenditures (Spanish Ministry of Environment, Rural and 
Marine Affairs, MARM, 2007a).  
The EU is the third most important cereal producer in the world (behind China 
and the US) and accounts for 14.3% of total production, as well as 24.1% of world 
wheat exports and 42.9% of world barley exports (FAOSTAT, 2004). The main COP 
producing countries within the EU are France and Germany, followed by Italy, Poland 
and Spain.1 The rate of self-sufficiency in the EU is on the order of 118% for cereals, 
80% for protein crops and 44% for oilseeds. The Spanish COP sector contributes 11% 
to the final agricultural output in Spain and is the third most frequent farming type 
among Spanish farms, after citrus and olive. Within Spain, the COP sector accounts for 
28% of total EAGGF expenses, 48% of the UAA, and 37% of total agricultural area 
(Spanish Ministry of Environment, Rural and Marine Affairs, MARM, 2007b).  
Compared to other EU producers, Spanish COP yields are lower with high 
annual variation due to uneven rainfall (Eurostat, 2007)2.  Further, the average Spanish 
COP farm size (52.71 ha) is above the EU average (46.3 ha) (FAO, 2006; and Eurostat, 
2008), although it is below the average farm size in France and Germany, on the order 
of 78.11 ha and 64.09 ha, respectively (Eurostat, 2008). 
The COP sector is not only relevant because of its physical and economic 
magnitude, but also because of the political attention it receives. The Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms that occurred during the 1990s involved specific 
policies for this sector. The reform in 1992 and Agenda 2000 involved reductions in 
                                                 
1
 France ranks first among European countries in COP production accounting for 23.3% of total 
production followed by Germany with 15%, and Poland and Italy with 7% each one. Spain is on the fifth 
position with 6.8% of EU production.  
2
 Over the 1995-2006 period, Spanish COP yields had an average year-to-year variation of 11% compared 
to less than 1% for Greece and the United Kingdom, and between 1-2% for France and Italy.  
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market price supports for COP crops (European Commission, 2007). The negative 
effects from price changes on farming incomes were compensated with area payments. 
In order to be eligible for these payments professional farmers were required to set aside 
a fixed percentage of program crop areas and were granted a set-aside compensatory 
payment. A voluntary set-aside in addition to the compulsory one was also allowed and 
granted compensatory payments.  
The area payments that had already been introduced in 1992 were not a fully 
decoupled measure since they were still tied to farmers’ production decisions.3 As noted 
by Serra et al. (2005), although these payments do not reward an increase in yields, they 
do not allow full planting flexibility to farmers and thus they are expected to affect 
production decisions. However, because these payments are only partially decoupled, 
their impacts on farmers’ decisions should be smaller than the impacts of price supports. 
Previous analyses on the effects of the CAP reforms provide empirical support on this 
hypothesis (Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 1996; Moro and Sckokai, 1999; Serra et al. 
2005). 
The changes involved with CAP reforms may have altered farmers’ production 
decisions. A reduction in price supports in favor of partially decoupled payments can 
motivate a more extensive use of land, which may involve a reduction in input use, or a 
change in the types of inputs employed in favor of cheaper alternatives. It is also 
possible that farms alter crop mix in response to policy reforms. In this regard, setting 
land aside becomes an attractive alternative for less fertile land plots. It is also possible 
that changes in production decisions alter farm technical efficiency.  
                                                 
3
 It is important to note that the 1999 reform further decoupled support relative to the 1992 reform, 
because it further reduced price supports in favor of more direct payment support.  
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Our study assesses the impacts of Agenda 2000 on production decisions and 
production efficiency for a sample of Spanish COP farms. This analysis is based on an 
unbalanced panel of farm-level data. We utilize a frontier estimate of a distance function 
that accommodates multiple inputs and outputs. The distance function allows for 
estimation of a farm’s deviation from the distance function frontier and permits an 
assessment of the effects of the reform on technical efficiency. It also allows for 
analysis regarding the impacts of policy reforms on the crop mix as well as on the use of 
agricultural inputs. Although previous analyses focused on the effects of the CAP 
reforms (see Serra et al., 2005; Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 1996; Moro and Sckokai, 
2006; and OECD, 2006), no previous studies have used a distance function to assess the 
impacts of decoupling of farm production decisions.   
The following section presents an overview of the Agenda 2000 CAP policy 
reform and is followed by a presentation of the theoretical framework. The next sections 
discuss the econometric specification and the empirical application. This is followed by 
the presentation of results and concluding comments. 
 
2. An overview of Agenda 2000 reform 
 
In 1997, the European Commission made CAP reform proposals. The European 
Council then agreed on the policy in March 1999, known as the Agenda 2000 (Ackrill, 
2000). Agenda 2000 was built on the principles established by the 1992 CAP reform. 
Reforms occurring during the 1990s were in response to EU’s CAP internal and 
external challenges, the first one being the increase in worldwide agricultural 
production, which caused falling international prices. EU prices traditionally maintained 
high levels compared to world market prices through widespread use of price-support 
mechanisms. This intervention had the objective of ensuring a fair standard of living for 
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farmers, but often led to production surpluses that were usually sold at subsidized prices 
in international markets.  
The second challenge concerned international pressures, especially within the 
World Trade Organization, to reduce trade distortions caused by the CAP. Thus, the 
Agenda 2000 was designed to account for the expected increase in international 
pressures (the new WTO round started in 1999) towards a further liberalization of CAP. 
The third challenge was the social dissatisfaction arising from perceived unjust 
redistribution efforts4. The unequal distribution of agricultural support between regions 
and producers resulted in a decline in agriculture in some regions and overly intensive 
farming practices in others, which generates pollution, animal disease and food safety 
concerns (European Commission, 1997). Finally, the focus of Agenda 2000 was to 
facilitate the accession to the EU of Central and Eastern European countries by reducing 
existing agricultural price differences.  
The measures introduced by CAP reforms in the 1990s reduced cereal 
institutional prices and abolished institutional pricing of oilseeds and protein crops. To 
compensate producers for their income reduction, an Arable Area Payments Scheme 
based on historic regional yields was introduced in 1992 and reinforced with the 
Agenda 2000. Eligibility to receive these payments was contingent upon setting aside 
part of the eligible land. Fields set aside could not be used for any commercial purpose, 
with the exception of the production of non-food crops.  
                                                 
4
 The 1992 reforms did not overcome the redistribution problems of the old CAP. Since the new 
compensatory payments were paid on a per hectares basis, the largest landowners continued to receive 
more support relative to small farmers. In any case, the Agenda 2000 was not designed to make the 
distribution of support more equal. 
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Direct payments for set aside land were also introduced in 1992 and fixed at the 
same level as arable land payments. Initially, the set aside instrument was a measure to 
tackle excess production. With the participation in the Arable Area Payments Scheme 
being voluntary, compensatory payments were made to induce farmers to withdraw land 
from production (Roberts et al. 1996). In the first year after the 1992 reforms, farmers 
who seek compensatory payment –except for small producers5- participated voluntarily 
to set aside 15% of their arable land. The Commission could adjust annually the 
percentage of compulsory set aside on the basis of forecasts of market developments6. 
The Agenda 2000 mandated 10% of the arable land be set aside and allowed for a 
voluntary set aside amount up to another 10%. The voluntary set aside program allowed 
producers to retire more land than under strict compulsory7 and still receive the 
corresponding compensatory payments. Small scale farms were exempted from the set-
aside obligation. 
 
3. Econometric framework 
 
Many studies assuming a multiple-output technology have used a dual cost 
function or have aggregated the multiple outputs into a single index. This index can be 
viewed as a multilateral superlative index (using a Tornqvist8 or Fisher index) or simply 
aggregate revenue. While the first approach requires an assumption of revenue 
                                                 
5
 The ‘small producers’ are those growing less than 92 tons of cereals which is equivalent roughly to an 
area of about 20 ha. (European Commission, 1997; and European Community, 2003). 
6
 In the Spanish case, the compulsory set aside before Agenda 2000 was fixed at 10% of the arable land 
except for 1995 when it was increased up to 12% and 1997 and 1998 when it was reduced to 5%. 
7
 Under the condition that their set-aside area does not exceed the planted COP area. 
8 Caves et al. (1982). 
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maximizing or cost- minimizing behavior, which presupposes the availability of price 
information, the second can lead to aggregation problems. 
Other recent studies, based on a parametric frontier approach, model a multiple 
output production technology using an input requirement function, where inputs (single 
or aggregate) are expressed as a function of outputs (Gathon and Perelman, 1992); or, 
an output/input-oriented distance function (Lovell et al., 1994; and Coelli and Perelman, 
1996, 2000) that uses multiple outputs and inputs. An output-oriented distance function 
is used in this study.  
The output distance function is an output-expanding approach to the 
measurement of the distance between a producer and the boundary of production 
possibilities. It yields the maximum amount by which an output vector can be inflated 
with a given input vector (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). For multiple outputs and 
multiple inputs the output distance function, introduced by Shephard (1953, 1970) is 
defined as: 
 
( ) ( ){ }0 ( , , ) min / ,D y x R y x Rλ λ λ= ∈ Ρ  (1) 
 
where y denotes a non-negative vector of outputs, ( ),x RΡ  describes the sets of output 
vectors that are feasible for each input vector x, given the external factors vector R. 
Parameter λ  is the scalar “distance” by which the output vector can be inflated. 
0 ( , , )D y x R  is homogeneous of degree one in outputs, is a convex function of y, 
nonincreasing in each input, and is nondecreasing in each output. The output vector is 
an element of the feasible technology set such that P(x, R), 0 ( , , )D y x R  ≤ 1. If the output 
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vector is located on the outer boundary of the production possibility set, the distance 
function will take a value of unity (Lovell et al., 1994). 
Following the seminal papers of Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957), firm 
efficiency can be defined and measured as the distance of its actual performance from a 
frontier. The distance function provides radial measures of the distance from the output 
bundle to the boundary of the production technology. The relationship between the 
distance function and radial technical efficiency is given by: 
 
( , ) ( , , ; ) 1 ( , , ; ) 1u uo o oTE x y D x y R e D x y R eβ β−= = ≤ ⇔ =  for 0u ≥    (2) 
 
where u  is a vector of independently distributed and nonnegative random disturbances 
that provide a measure of output-oriented technical efficiency, e  is the exponential 
function, β  is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and  1),(0 ≤≤ yxTEo  is 
the measure of technical efficiency. If ( , ) ( )1= <oTE x y , the observation is efficient 
(inefficient) as it lies on (below) the frontier.  
 
4. Econometric specification 
 
The specification of an error component implies the model takes on a stochastic 
production frontier perspective as initially developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) for production functions. Such models 
have two error terms. The technical inefficiency error term (-u) is augmented by a two-
sided error component (v) representing other factors that might generate irrelevant noise 
in the data (such as measurement error and unobserved inputs). We use maximum 
likelihood techniques to estimate the stochastic production frontier model. 
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The stochastic distance function model with M outputs, K inputs and B 
exogenous variables can be written as 
 
{ }1 ( , , ; )*expo ki mi bi i iD x y r v uβ= −  (3) 
 
where i denotes the ith firm in the sample, while m,  k and b  indicate the mth output, kth 
input and bth exogenous factor, respectively. To estimate the model in (3), we take 
advantage of an output distance function property which implies that 
( , , ; ) ( , , ; ), 0.o ki mi bi o ki mi biD x y r D x y rλ β λ β λ= ≥  After setting ( ) 1/ 21 2i mimy yλ −−= = ∑ , the 
reciprocal of the Euclidean norm of the output vector, we get 
1
0 ( , , ; ) ( , , ; )miik bi i o ik mi bi
i
yD x r y D x y r
y
β β−=  which implies that 
0 ( , , ; ) . ( , , ; )miik mi bi i o ik bi
i
yD x y r y D x r
y
β β= . Substituting this equation into (3), we obtain:  
{ }1 ( , , ; ).expmii o ik bi i i
i
y
y D x r u v
y
β− = −  (4) 
 
where the dependent variable is the reciprocal of the norm of the output vector chosen 
for normalization and the regressors are the inputs and the normalized outputs. iv  is a 
vector of random errors that are assumed to be iid 20 vN( , )σ , and iu  is a vector of 
independently distributed and nonnegative random disturbances that are associated with 
output-oriented technical inefficiencies. 
To empirically estimate our model, we assume that the distance function can be 
approximated by a translog specification. This functional form has the advantages of 
flexibility, homogeneity is easily imposed and it is linear in the parameters (Lovell et 
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al., 1994; Grosskopf et al., 1997; Coelli and Perelman, 2000). Flexibility allows for 
substitution through the incorporation of second-order (interaction or cross-) terms 
across (outputs and) inputs, as well as for policy impacts within the function. These 
substitution possibilities do not require restrictive assumptions about the nature of the 
technological relationship. 
( , , ; )uoD x ye R β  takes the translog form with M outputs, K inputs and B 
exogenous determinants and can be written as:  
 
0
1 1ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
2 2
ln ln ln ln +   
                1, 2, ...,
mi m ni
k ki m kl ki li mn
k m k l m n
m i mi
km ki R b kb ki b mb b i i
k m b k b m b
y y yy x x x
y y y
y y
x r x r r u v
y y
i N
β β β β β
β γ γ γ
= + + + + +
+ + + −
=
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 (5) 
 
Normalization of the translog distance function by one of the outputs allows for 
the imposition of homogeneity restrictions. The summation sign over m, n, (k,l), [b] 
implies summation over all M outputs ym, (K inputs xk) [B exogenous factors rb]. The 
one-sided error component i i iu zδ η= +  is assumed to be an independently distributed 
and nonnegative truncation of the normal distribution with mean δ iz , where iz  is a 
(Nx1) vector that includes the determinants of a farm’s technical inefficiency and δ  is a 
(Nx1) vector of unknown parameters. 20
i
N ηη σ∼ ( , )  is a random variable defined by the 
truncation of the normal distribution.  
 
5. Assessment of the impacts of the CAP reform 
As described above, the 1990s CAP reforms involved a reduction in price 
support measures in favor of area payments. While eligibility for area payments was 
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conditional on compulsory set aside, voluntary set aside was also allowed. In our 
analysis we distinguish between two outputs, COP production and voluntary set aside, 
in order to assess whether decoupling measures have reduced farmers’ incentive to 
produce in favor of retiring land. A set of different inputs described in the empirical 
implementation section are also considered to determine the impacts of the reforms on 
agricultural input productivity and use. Finally, we are also interested in assessing the 
impacts of the reforms on the efficiency with which farms operate.  
From the output distance function we can calculate a series of first and second-
order elasticities of 0D  that permit us to evaluate the impacts of policy measures on the 
aspects of interest; e.g.,  marginal productivity of inputs, input composition, output 
composition and efficiency (Morrison et al., 2000). The overall reform impact on 
production is measured through the first-order elasticity, Ry,ε , where 
 
, (0,1)lny R Ryε == ∂  (6) 
 
such that R is a dummy variable equal to 1 after the reform and equal to zero for the 
period before the reform. The elasticity in (6) measures the productive impact of a 
policy reform, i.e., whether a reform causes any shift in the production possibility 
frontier (PPF). A policy reform, however, may not only involve a change in total output, 
but it may also impact the crop mix, input use and input mix. Second-order input and 
output elasticities allow for an evaluation of these other issues.  
The output elasticity for each input, xk , can be defined as follows: 
 
,
ln / ln / ( / )y k ki ki kiy x y x x yε = ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂  (7) 
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where 
,y kε  represents the percentage change in output y, due to a unit increase in input 
k. Using equation (7), we decompose
,y kε  into its second-order components: 
 
,
ln / ln ln 2 ln my k k i k k l li km kb b i
l m b
yy x x r
y
ε β β β γ= ∂ ∂ = + + +∑ ∑ ∑  (8)  
 
The four components of the
,y kε  elasticity are: i) kβ , which measures the direct 
impact of input xk on the production of y; ii) lnkl li kl
l l
x Cβ =∑ ∑ , which measures the 
cross-effect between inputs xk and xl, represents the complementary ( 0>klC ) or 
substitution ( 0<klC ) relationship between these inputs; iii) ln mkm km
m m
y C
y
β =∑ ∑ , 
which represents the impact of output ym on xk productivity; and, iv)  kb bi kb
b b
r Cγ =∑ ∑ , 
measures the impact of the exogenous factor (reform) on xk productivity.  As explained 
by Morrison et al. (2000), this last measure also picks up changes in the input mix. A 
policy reform will be input reducing (neutral, increasing) if 0),( >=<kbC . 
The tradeoff between the different outputs y and ym is defined by the following 
first-order elasticity 
 
,
ln / ln my m
y
y
y
ε = ∂ ∂  (9) 
 
This measure reflects the shape of the PPF when the factors of production are 
used to their full potential. The greater the quantity of y produced, the less the 
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production of the other output (ym). This measure is used in the output distance function 
to reflect the shadow value through the (y, ym) space.  
Second-order elasticities of (9) can be defined as: 
 
,
ln 2. lny m m mn ni mb bi km ki
n b k
y r xε β β γ β= + + +∑ ∑ ∑  (10) 
 
We focus on the cross term linked with the exogenous variable (reform), and its 
impact on the contribution of overall production: γ∑ mb bi
b
r . More specifically, parameter 
mbγ  can be used to evaluate whether a change in reform generates a change in the slope 
of the PPF and thus on production composition. As Morrison et al. (2000) note, 
( )0γ < >mb  reflects a twist in the frontier that increases (reduces) the relative importance 
of my  within the total output. 
 
6. Empirical implementation 
 
The output distance function is estimated using a sample of 2,474 COP farms 
observed over the nine-year period from 1995 to 2003, which makes for an unbalanced 
panel of 9,852 observations. These data are obtained from the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN) database using the farm type 13 (specialist cereal, oilseed and protein 
crop farms). Price indices are taken from Eurostat (2006).  
Although our analysis is based on farm-level data, aggregate measures are used 
to define some variables that are unavailable from the FADN dataset. Input and output 
price indices necessary to deflate all monetary variables were derived from Eurostat. 
The base year of all monetary variables is 1995. The Department of Agriculture, Food 
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and Rural Action of the Catalan Government (DAR) and the Ministry of Environment, 
Rural and Marine Affairs (MARM) (MARM, 2007c), provided unpublished data on 
yields, percentages and payments for voluntary and compulsory set aside by year and 
region (Autonomous communities)9. These data were used to estimate farm-level 
voluntary set aside payments as detailed below. 
We estimate a translog distance function with two outputs and five inputs, 
augmented by a reform variable to account for the policy impact. The two outputs that 
we define represent the revenue from COP crop production, y, and the revenue 
generated from voluntary set aside, my , respectively. As noted, the distinctions between 
these two outputs allow us to assess whether decoupling measures have reduced 
farmers’ incentive to produce in favor of retiring land.  
FADN does not register the voluntary set aside payment; only a single variable 
including total (voluntary and compulsory) set-aside is available. We estimate this 
magnitude at the farm level by concentrating on professional producers defined as farms 
that have a COP area greater than or equal to 20 ha. As can be shown in Figure 1, 
professional farms account for about 90% of total COP area in Spain. Professional 
producers cannot receive area payments unless they comply with the compulsory set 
aside rules.  
We estimate the obligatory set aside area by applying the percentage of 
compulsory set aside (see footnote 9) to COP area. The total set aside area provided by 
FADN data set minus the estimated compulsory set aside area give us the approximate 
voluntary set aside area. If the estimated value exceeds the maximum value (see also 
                                                 
9
 As mentioned in section 2, the compulsory set aside was established at 10% of the total COP area except 
for years 1995 (12%) and 1997 and 1998 (5%). Voluntary set aside was fixed at a maximum of 10% of 
total COP area along our sample period. 
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footnote 9), we replace our estimate with the maximum value. Figure 2 shows the 
average take up of voluntary set aside across farm sizes in Spain. As can be observed, 
voluntary set aside has accounted for 4.5% of total COP area being this percentage 
slightly higher in smaller farms.  
Finally, we estimate the voluntary set aside payment10 by applying the following 
formula:  
 
= × ×m ay S Y P         (11) 
 
where my is the estimated voluntary set aside payment (expressed in 1995 €), aS  is the 
estimated voluntary set aside area (ha), Y is  the regional yield (tonnes/ha) applied to 
determine the set aside payment11, and P is the voluntary set aside payment (€/tonnes).  
Input variables are labor ( Lx ), defined as total hours spent on farm work, 
expenditure on fertilizers ( Fx ), pesticides ( Px ), and other inputs such as seed costs and 
farming overheads ( Ix ). The total area allocated to COP production and set aside 
defines the land variable LNDx . The policy reform variable is incorporated into the 
translog function specification by using a dummy variable that is equal to zero before 
2000 and equal to 1 otherwise (R). An additional dummy variable is included that is 
equal to 1 if the farm is located in a less favored area (LFA) and 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
10
 We expressed voluntary set aside in monetary term, because the other outputs (COP production) are 
expressed in monetary term. 
11
 Following the “Plan de Regionalización Productiva” (productive regionalization plan) (unpublished 
data from MARM) and distinguishing between irrigated and non-irrigated land. 
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Vector iz , in the technical inefficiency effects function, is a (1x5) vector that 
contains four determinants of technical inefficiency and a constant ( 1z ). The first 
determinant is a time trend. Since farm managers may learn from their errors, the 
passage of time may improve efficiency levels. The dummy variable for the policy 
reform defined as R, is also included. The reduction of price support measures in favor 
of area payments may have altered the efficiency with which farms operate. A third 
component of vector iz  is the birth year of the holding’s primary decision maker. Older 
farmers are expected to be less efficient in comparison to younger ones. The final 
covariate measures the workforce composition which is measured by the ratio of family 
labour hours to total labour hours. As shown by previous literature (Lambarraa et al., 
2007), as family labour is more relevant in small, less competitive farms, it may be 
associated to a higher level of inefficiency. 
Summary statistics for the variables of interest are presented in Table 1. The 
value of COP production decreased over the whole period of analysis, while voluntary 
set aside increased substantially with a growth rate exceeding 90%. This positive 
evolution of set aside can be explained by a) the positive evolution of the support for 
idling land (from 54.29€/Ton an average during 1995-99, to an average of 61.92 €/Ton 
during 2000-03) (MARM, 2007c) and b) the positive evolution of voluntary set aside 
area between the pre and post reform period, which increased by 81.68% between the 
two periods. This resulted in a change in the output structure in favor of voluntary set 
aside, a result that is expected and suggests that decoupling policies provide incentives 
that compensate for setting aside some (presumably low yielding) land.12 Input use 
increased throughout the period studied; pesticides, other costs and fertilizers increased 
from the pre-to-post reform period by 10%, 9% and 19%, respectively. Total area, 
                                                 
12
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us such issue. 
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however, decreased by 2% in the post reform period. This decrease is the result of a 
2.7% decrease in COP area which was not compensated by the 81% increase in the 
voluntary set aside area. Table 1 also shows that 60% of the farms in our sample are 
located in less favored areas, the average age of farm operators is 49 years old, and 
family labor represents 89% of total labor used in production. 
 
7. Results 
 
The results from the translog distance function estimation are presented in Table 
2. Most of the coefficients are found to be significant at the 1 % level. For output, the 
negative parameter of my  (voluntary set aside payment) reflects the shape of the PPF. 
This shape shows an efficient combination between COP production and voluntary set 
aside and illustrates the principle of increasing cost. As more COP product is produced 
( y ), proportionally larger amounts of voluntary set aside ( my ) must be given up. The 
negative less favored area coefficient indicates that holdings facing different 
environmental restrictions are less productive relative to other farms. The negative 
direct effect of reform suggests a downward shift in the PPF. 
All the input cross-terms are significant except for the labor-pesticides and 
fertilizers-land interaction. The positive cross-terms between labor-land and labor-other 
inputs imply a technological complementary relationship between these pairs of inputs. 
Similarly, fertilizer is a technological complement to both pesticides and other inputs, 
while land is complementary to pesticides. On the other hand, there is a technological 
substitution relationship between labor and fertilizers, land and other input costs and 
pesticides and other input costs.  
 18
The estimated δ  coefficient vector addresses the determinants of farms’ 
technical inefficiency, and the impact of Agenda 2000 on technical efficiency. All 
parameters are statistically significant except for the birth year of the primary decision 
maker which is marginally significant. The negative coefficient for the time variable 
suggests that, contrary to our expectations, technical inefficiency of COP farms has 
been decreasing over time. The coefficient representing farmer’s birth year suggests that 
younger farmers are more efficient than older ones. This result may be explained by the 
fact that younger farmers may be more likely to introduce efficiency-improving changes 
in their holdings relative to older ones. The family labour coefficient is positive, 
indicating that farms with a higher proportion of unpaid labour are less efficient relative 
to the farms with a higher proportion of remunerated work. These results are compatible 
with results from Lambarraa et al., (2007) and Latruffe et al. (2004). 
Finally, the reform coefficient indicates a significant negative impact on the 
technical efficiency of Spanish COP farms. Specifically, Agenda 2000 seems to have 
had a relevant negative effect on the technical efficiency level of Spanish COP farms. 
Thus, farms may respond to a decline in price supports by reducing the efficiency with 
which operate, a result that is compatible with a reduced motivation to produce 
efficiently given the lower income derived from producing (Serra et al., 2008)13.  
To better interpret parameter estimates and determine the influence of the 
Agenda 2000, we calculate the elasticities detailed above. Results are presented in 
Tables 3 and 4. Output elasticities with respect to labor, land, other input costs and 
fertilizers have the expected positive sign, whereas the output elasticity with respect to 
                                                 
13
 It is important to note here that changes in efficiency levels imply changes in the distance of each farm 
with respect to the frontier. 
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pesticides is negative. Other input costs are the most productive input followed by labor, 
fertilizer and land. 14  
The reform-related component of the labor input elasticity suggests that Agenda 
2000 had a positive impact on labor productivity (Table 3). Conversely, the marginal 
productivity of fertilizers, pesticides, other inputs, and land decreased in response to 
policy changes. Changes in input productivity are associated with changes in input 
composition involving an increase in the quantity of labor to the detriment of land, 
fertilizer, pesticides and other input quantities. It is important to recognize that our 
sample farms mainly use family labor which is generally unpaid and thus involves an 
opportunity cost, not a direct cost. Hence, farms are changing input composition in 
favor of an increase in opportunity costs to reduce direct costs in other inputs. 
The first order elasticity,
,y mε  reflects the shape of the production possibility 
frontier. In Table 4, we can see that the tradeoff between COP production and voluntary 
set aside is about -0.96 through the period studied, implying that an additional 
percentage of COP produced leads to a 0.96 percent decline in set aside. Based on 
parameter estimates presented in table 2, the policy component of this elasticity shows 
an increased share of voluntary set aside on total production as a response to Agenda 
2000.  
The impact of reform on overall production or productivity is measured by Ry ,ε  
and is presented in the second section of Table 4. The global policy impact of the 
reform is negative, which suggests that the PPF shifts inward after reform (γR).  The 
components of the Ry ,ε  indicate that the impact of reform is large and positive for the 
                                                 
14
 A decomposition of pesticides elasticity into its second-order components indicates that pesticides have 
indeed a direct positive effect on output. However, counteracting substitutability with labor and other 
inputs cost yield a final negative total effect. 
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productivity of labor and largely negative for other input costs, fertilizers, pesticides and 
land, which confirms the input composition change described above. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper focuses on the impacts of Agenda 2000 on a sample of Spanish COP 
farmers’ production decisions by using an output-oriented stochastic distance function. 
Given the partitioning of output into COP and the value of the set aside, the distance 
function permits the assessment of the reform-motivated changes on multiple outputs, 
inputs used, input composition and crop mix. It also permits an assessment of the 
impacts of the reform on farms’ technical efficiency.  
The results show that the reform shifted the PPF inward. The decline in 
production possibilities can be explained by both the decline in price supports, as well 
as a decline in COP output not fully compensated by the compensatory payment to 
withdraw land. With respect to input composition, Agenda 2000 induced a decrease in 
land use for COP production (which is an implicit policy objective), a decrease in 
fertilizers, pesticides and other inputs in favor of labor. Since farms in our sample 
mainly use unpaid family labor, results suggest that input composition is changing to 
reduce total direct costs in favor of opportunity costs. The reduction in fertilizer, 
pesticides and other inputs use as a result of Agenda 2000, clearly contributes positively 
toward the environmental goal of the reform. In addition, Agenda 2000 has had a 
negative impact on technical efficiency; which is compatible with reduced motivation to 
produce efficiently as a response to the lower rents derived from producing. The 
increase in inefficiency levels coupled with an increase in subsidized set aside land 
suggests that the reform has somewhat created and early retirement option for farmers. 
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Table 1. Description of sample data  
 
Variable 
Unit of 
measure 
Mean Standard Error 
1995-2003 1995-1999 2000-2003 1995-2003 
Voluntary set 
aside 
€ 369.34 715.31 529.93 (10.73) 
COP outputs € 31609.01 30296.95 30831.84 (308.71) 
Pesticides € 1259.15 1503.31 1389.05 (22.17) 
Fertilizer € 5420.74 5933.79 5739.21 (68.26) 
Other costs € 110.14 121.62 116.51 (1.14) 
Labor hours 2485.35 2516.81 2512.35 (17.50) 
Land ha 115.29 113.07 115.24 (1.51) 
Voluntary set 
aside area 
ha 2.59 4.70 3.57 (0.07) 
COP area ha 85.94 83.61 85.65 (0.89) 
Less favored 
area 
dummy 
  
0.60 (0.004) 
Work force ratio 
  
0.89 (0.002) 
Age* years 
  
49.41 (0.12) 
* FADN dataset provides the manager’s birth year. However, we have converted this variable to the 
manager’s age only for the purpose of presenting more useful data in this table.  
Source: Spanish Ministry of Environment, Rural and Marine Affairs (MARM) and the Department of 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Action of the Catalan Government (DAR). 
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Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of output distance function for COP farms in 
Spain, 1995-2003  
Variables  Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Frontier production function 
Voluntary set aside output ym -0.68165 (0.22644)*** 
Labor βLB -0.63157 (0.07703)*** 
Fertilizers βF 0.122239 (0.07956) 
Pesticides βP 0.322789 (0.07055)*** 
Land βL -0.266738 (0.08177)*** 
Other Inputs cost ΒI -0.230571 (0.12658)* 
Fertilizers × Labour βF..LB -0.050310 (0.02120)*** 
Pesticides × Labour βP.LB -0.001730 (0.01869) 
Land × Labour βL.LB 0.121664 (0.02495)*** 
Other Inputs × Labour ΒI.LB 0.239485 (0.03012)*** 
Fertilizers × Pesticides βF.P 0.071129 (0.01136)*** 
Fertilizers × Land βF.L -0.026224 (0.01714) 
Land × Pesticides βL.P 0.024817 (0.01346)* 
Fertilizers × Other Inputs βF.I 0.104104 (0.01747)*** 
Other Inputs × Pesticides ΒI.P -0.191478 (0.01759)*** 
Other Inputs × Land ΒI.L -0.072450 (0.02757)*** 
Other Inputs × ym ΒI.Ym -1.16979 (0.177101)*** 
Land × ym βL.Ym 1.735939 (0.092037)*** 
Pesticides × ym βP.Ym 0.229332 (0.107885)** 
Fertlizers × ym βF.Ym 0.221808 (0.027313)*** 
Labour × ym βLB.Ym -0.481767 (0.009311)*** 
Labour × Reform γLB.R 0.124945 (0.193324)*** 
Fertilizers × Reform γF.R -0.027896 (0.013950)** 
Pesticides × Reform γP.R -0.051199 (0.010164)*** 
Land × Reform γL.R -0.047778 (0.013340)*** 
Other Inputs × Reform γI.R -0.017650 (0.021777) 
ym × Reform γYm.R -0.654023 (0.142799)*** 
Reform γR -0.295036 (0.144427)** 
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Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of output distance function for COP farms in 
Spain, 1995-2003 (continued)  
Variables  Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Less Favoured Area βLFA -0.034334 (0.01090)*** 
Constant β0 7.067252 (0.522801)*** 
Inefficiency effects model 
Constant δ0 123.795 (27.5835)*** 
Time δT -0.062508 (0.01381)*** 
Reform δR 0.177311 (0.08112)** 
Year of birth δYB -0.002513 (0.00149)* 
Workforce composition δWC 0.269615 (0.09054)*** 
 
   
log likelihood function = -6759.30 
LR test of the one-sided error = 34.60 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate that the parameter is significant at the 1% and 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3. Input elasticities decomposition 
,y kε  
Input elasticities Value Standard Error 
The output elasticity of labour 
,y LBε  0.69046 (0.09644)*** 
βLB -0.63157 (0.07703)*** 
C F.LB -0.18124 (0.00047)*** 
CP.LB -0.03340 (0.00002)*** 
C
 L.LB 0.54005 (0.00088)*** 
C I.LB 1.07293 (0.00174)*** 
C Ym.LB -0.15676 (0.09641)*** 
C
 R.LB 0.05597 (0.00062)*** 
The output elasticity of pesticides 
,y Pε  -0.13023 (0.04591)*** 
βP 0.32278 (0.07055)*** 
C
 LB.P -0.01326 (0.00001)*** 
C P.F 0.25624 (0.00067)*** 
C L.P 0.11016 (0.00018)*** 
C I.P -0.85785 (0.00139)*** 
C Ym.P 0.07462 (0.04589)*** 
C R.P -0.02293 (0.00025)*** 
The output elasticity of land 
,y Lε  0.83816 (0.34741) 
βL -0.26673 (0.08177)*** 
C
 LB.L 0.93262 (0.00070)*** 
C F.L -0.09447 (0.00024)*** 
C P.L 0.04789 (0.00029)*** 
C I.L -0.32459 (0.00052)*** 
C Ym.L 0.56485 (0.34742) 
C R.L -0.02140 (0.00023)*** 
Note: βi measures the direct impact of the ith input on the production of y (i=Labour (LB), pesticides (P), 
Land (L), Other inputs (I) and fertilizers (F)); C i.j measures the cross-effect between inputs ith and jth, 
CYm.i represents the impact of output ym on the productivity of the ith input, and C R.i represents the policy 
reform impact on input use. 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate that the parameter is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3. Input elasticities decomposition 
,y kε (continued)  
Input elasticities Value Standard Error 
The output elasticity of other inputs 
,y Iε
 
 0.90053 (0.23415)*** 
βI -0.230571 (0.12658)** 
C LB.I 1.83577 (0.00138)*** 
C F.I 0.37504 (0.00099)*** 
C P.I -0.36956 (0.00226)*** 
C L.I -0.32160 (0.00052)*** 
C Ym.I -0.38063 (0.23411)* 
C
 R.I -0.00790 (0.00008)*** 
The output elasticity of fertilizers 
,y Fε  0.28354 (0.04438)*** 
βF 0.12223 (0.07956)*** 
C LB.F -0.38565 (0.00029)*** 
CP.F 0.13728 (0.00084)*** 
C
 L.F -0.11640 (0.00019)*** 
C I.F 0.46640 (0.00075)*** 
C Ym.F 0.07217 (0.04439)*** 
C R.F  -0.01249 (0.00013)*** 
Note: βi measures the direct impact of the ith input on the production of y (i=Labour (LB), pesticides (P), 
Land (L), Other inputs (I) and fertilizers (F)); C i.j measures the cross-effect between inputs ith and jth, 
CYm.i represents the impact of output ym on the productivity of the ith input, and C R.i represents the policy 
reform impact on input use. 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate that the parameter is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4. Second-order 
,y mε  and Ry ,ε  components 
 
 
Value Standard Error 
Voluntary set aside (Ym)elasticity ,y mε  
,y mε  
-0.96110 (0.01555)*** 
βm -0.68165 (0.22644)*** 
CYm.I -0.38063 (0.23411)*** 
CYm.L 0.56485 (0.34742)* 
CYm.P 0.07462 (0.04589)* 
CYm.F 0.07217 (0.04439)* 
CYm.LB -0.15676 (0.09641)*** 
CYm.R -0.29302 (0.00327)*** 
Reform elasticity Ry ,ε    
,y Rε  -0.04055 (0.01308)*** 
CR.LB 0.95777 (0.00072)*** 
CR.F -0.10049 (0.00026)*** 
CR.P -0.09881 (0.00060)*** 
CR.L -0.21208 (0.00034)*** 
CR.I -0.07907 (0.00012)***  
CR.Ym -0.21281 (0.11089)* 
CR.R -0.29503 (0.14442)*** 
Note: βm measures the direct impact of voluntary set aside on the production of y; CYm.i measures the 
cross-effect between voluntary set aside and the ith input (K=Labour (LB), pesticides (P), Land (L), Other 
inputs (I) and fertilizers (F)), while cross effects  CR.i and CYm.R
 
represent the policy reform impacts on 
input use and voluntary set aside respectively. 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate that the parameter is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Spanish COP area by farm size (Percentage in total COP area) 
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Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE, 2005) and own elaboration 
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Figure 2. Take up of voluntary set aside across farm sizes in Spain 
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